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To : Chief, SE

Attn: C

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Date 6 October 1952

From : Chief -

VIA:

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SUBJECT: GENERAL— BGFIEND

SPECIFIC- Greek Suspicions of British-Yugoslav Cooperation

REFERENCE: □ □

l. As a follow-up on information in reference: On October 1, 1952, Identity (1) had an interview with Identity (2) of the Greek Foreign Ministry. Following is an account of the information obtained by Identity (1):

- a. Identity (2) declined to reveal the names of the Britishers who were reported to have visited the Yugoslav-Albanian border, however, he did say that one was a Colonel attached to the British Mission in Belgrade who recently visited in Athens.
- b. Identity (1) was informed that there had been a meeting between Identity (2) and Identity (3). The purpose of this meeting was to clarify, in the minds of the Greeks, the British position on Albania and the Yugoslav sponsored Prizren Committee. Identity (3) answered:
  - (1) The British policy is "hands off" Albania.
  - (2) The British are not collaborating with or interested in the Yugoslav activities other than a bystander's interest.
- c. Identity (2) assured Identity (1) that the Greeks did not believe that this is the true position of the British and he continues to think that they are interested in, if not supporting to a degree, the Yugoslav position.
- d. Identity (2) pointed out that the Greek Foreign Office felt that the U.S. attitude toward the whole problem of Albania was lax and that the Foreign Office was contemplating having their Ambassador in Washington present the State Department with this problem from the Greek point of view and, if possible, have the State Department bring pressure to bear on the Yugoslavs to control their ambitions and activities.
  - e. Identity (2) reiterated

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- e. Identity (2) reiterated the Greek position of not morally or logically being in a position to allow the Yugoslavs to step into Albania, either by instigated "internal revolt" or general war. He again said, "Greece would not sit idly by". He gave as a reason the Greek minority in the Gjinokaster area, a minority that Greece must protect; also, it would just mean transferring the border from one Communist country to another stronger Communist country.
- f. When Identity (2) was queried as to whether this problem was discussed with the Yugoslav Military Delegation or would be discussed in the future, he replied that it had not and would not be because, if this problem were presented by the Greeks to the Yugoslavs, the Yugoslavs would immediately bring up the problem of Greek Macedonia, which, of course, the Greeks will not discuss under any circumstances.

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Attachment (s.c.)
Identities

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Attachment 1 to

KAPOK-921

Identity (1) - Mr. Peter Lamas, U.S. Embassy Peripheral Officer

Identity (2) - Mr. Vasile Mostras

Identity (3) - Sir Peake, British Ambassador

KAPOK